Introduction
In Australia, as in most west, em countries, the issues of occupational health and safety have been sadly neglected. The reasons for this are varied but in general stem from the feeling that injuries were accidents of fate 1 and this, coupled with inadequate statistics, led to a tacit acceptance of the problem. The · effect has been for our society to view industrial health in terms of the ability of employees to continue in the production process {Dreitzel, i 971 ), w_ith the result that empl~yers .only considered safeguards when the viability of the business undertaking was seriously t};ueateiled. Unions also had been preoccupied with economic concerns and regarded safety issues as peripheral to their traditional concern with wages and conditions. When . safety issues did arise the emphasis was on "'dirt money" or compensation, rather than the prevention or reduction of risk. Given the attitude of employers and unions towards occupational health and safety, goverrunents saw fit only to enact the minimum of legislation. This legislation, often relying on self regulation, proved ineffective, for not only were the provisions inadequate and inspection facilities virtually non-existent, but there was a distinct lack <lf formal provisions for worker education on the dangers inherent in the industrial environment. Occupational health was thus seen primarily as the responsibility of the individual employee.
In r, ecent years th· e situation has changed, albeit slowly, Governments are now recognising the need to have more than an assortment of Factory Acts on their legislative records, with some Australian states having passed detailed legislation, for example the 1972 South Australian Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Act. Individual unions have also begun to develop health and safety policies with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in 1979 adopting its frrst policy on occupational health. The impetus for such changes is varied, but issues such as the Victorian Railways (VIC RAIL) Blue Train Asbestos Dispute of [1977] [1978] have been instrumental in generating awareness of the dangers of our industrial working environment and the need for employee protection through worker involvement and legal regulation. .
• The VIC RAIL Asbestos Dispute was significant for two reasons. First, the general awareness generated by the union campaign and the publicity given by the media was instrumental ~ workers' demands, both in VIC RAIL and other organisations, for protection as well as removal and substitution of asbestos products, being met. Second, it illustrated the need for workers and union officials to carefully assess the dangers present on the job; a task that cannot be left solely in the hands of management or the government. The unfortunate aspect of this dispute was that it was avoidable, as evidence of asbestos related illnesses was available at the time of the train's construction. This paper will examine this dispute and attempt to locate it in the context of these wider considerations. The firSt section briefly discusses the dangers of asbestos and the development of asbestos standards. The second section examines the dispute in some detail paying particular attention to the positions adopted by VIC RAIL, the Victorian Government and the unions involved, nantely the Australian Railways Union (ARU), the Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) and the Electrical Trades Union (ETU). The final section provides a brief analysis of the roles of the Industrlal Hygiene Division of the Victoria Health Commission (IHD), the Australian Concl1iation and Arbitration Commission (ACAC) and the significance of this dispute in subsequent industrial health matters.
Asbestos: Dangers and Standards
Asbestos is the name given to a group of naturally occurring mineral silicates that crystallize into silky fibres between layers of rock. The very properties that m•ke it : low cost, strength, stability in acids or alkalis and heat resistance, also underlie the ous nature of the substance. These properties have led to its widespread use, 2 but it ia this virtual indestructible nature of asbestos that has caused severe medical problema adaioa whenever it is inhaled or ingested. This is aptly summarised by Gillespie (undated p. 7) 11 ''miracle fibre-killer dust".
Asbestos is now recognised medically as representing a severe health threat (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 1977; Morgan, 1975) . However knowledge of the hazards of asbestos is not new:
The fmt case of asbestosis was diagnosed by an English doctor back in 1900, lea than 20 years after the asbestos industry had been established. Other were noted in Europe and North America in the ensuing years, so that by 1917 Canadian and United States insurance companies were no longer insuring asbestos workm because of the recognised health hazards associated with the industry.
1980,p.32)
• What is recent, is the public concern over the dangers of asbestos. This bighHghts the fact that scientific knowledge alone will afford little protection to those at risk with the onus falling on "others" to prove that a substance is dangerous. Companies with a interest in the mining of asbestos and the manufacture of asbestos-related products cannot be relied upon to provide self-critical information. In the same way, neither can bodies that make use of asbestos products. Successive governments, in Australia, both state and tederal, have for years been aware of the health problems associated with asbestos but have done little more than legislate for voluntary regulation. In Victoria, gowmment authorities like VIC RAIL and the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) haw n1ade extensive use of asbestos products and consequently would be faced with huae outlays if Parliament enacted comprehensive legislation. Thus, without access to the neceaary information and the support of government, the task of generating public awuen• ill extren1ely difficult.
Union involvement in health issues
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Medical problems directly associated with asbestos can be broken into asbestosis; a scarring of the lungs, and cancer, including mesothelioma; a rare form of lung and stomach cancer. Asbestosis was clearly established as an occupational disease by 1930 as a result of an investigation by members of the British Factory Inspectorate (Merwether and Price, 1930) . Fallowing this a number of studies began to link cancer with asbestos, which not only established "asbestos caused lung cancer" (Doll, 1955, pp. 81-86) , but also r, evealed that low levels of exposure werẽ significant and thus established the non-occupational hazards of asbestos (Wagner, 1960, pp. 260-271) .
3 Whilst all forms of asbestos are linked with both asbestosis and cancer it does appear that crocidolite or blue asbestos is the most dangerous form (National Health and Medical Research Council, undated) . An unfortunate aspect of asbestos-related illnesses is that apart from being incurable, signs of the illness often do not appear for many yẽars. As a consequence medical complaints are not always related to earlier asbestos exposure thus making more difficult preventative measures or at least the awareness of the need for such measures.
What then constitutes an acceptable level of airborn, e asbestos fibres under which no protective action need be taken? The World Health Õrganisation has stated that there exists no safe level of exposure to asbestos dust (Workers' Health Centre, undated), but the acceptance of a standard will be based on two facto is, namely; the measurement of the risk to workers expose~ to asbestos, and what constitutes an acc~ptable risk. As Lowrance (1976, pp. 75-76) points out, the former "is an empirical, scientific activity" whilst the latter constitutes a "normative, political activity". Thus the establishment of a standard will not depend solely on medical or scientific evidence but on the whole range of activities.
.
-operative in the political process.
In 1969 the British Government adopted a chrysotile (white asbestos) standard of 2 fibres/mi. That is the number of airborne asbestos fibres per millilitre of air must not e~ceed two without protective action taking place. 4 Many countries have since adopted this standard as the level of acceptable risk they are prepared to assume. Australia was slow to respond with Queensland in 1971 becoming the fust state to introduce some asbestos regulations. This legislation required notification of asbestos use, ventilation. , cleanliness and protective clothing, although no specific dust limit was set. South Australia followed in 1976 with a limit of 4 fibres/ml, with New South Wales adopting a limit of 2 fibres/ml, in 1978. (Gunningham, 1978, pp. 46-49) At the time the VIC RAIL dispute arose, Victoria did not have asbestos regulations, nor were there any proposed. Queensland and South Australia by this stage had banned the use of crocidolite {blue asbestos).
In the final analy:sis it will be those working with asbestos who will decide the level of tolerable risk. This is illustrated dramatically in the case of British Rail. For blue asbestos the British Factory Inspectorate standard was 0.2 fibres/ml, however British Rail adopted in 1967, after considerable union pressure, the more stringent standard of 0.05 fibres/mi.
The Dispute: Background, Issues and Their Resolution I VIC RAIL, as with many other large inaustrial undertakings, has made extensive use of asbestos and asbestos-related products. Of particular concern in this dispute was the use of asbestos as lining and insulation in what are known as the Harris (Blue) trains.
From 1957 to 1962 VIC RAIL imported about 90 Harris carriages from the United IGngdom and assembled another 130 at their Newport workshops. Blue asbestos in these carriages was used as insulation, being sprayed on the inside of the exterior walls from floor to ceiling. Carriages assembled after 1962 did not contain asbestos insulation as the Health Department had warned VIC RAIL that it could be dangerous.
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This matter was frrst 3 Wagner found that people not working in the mines but living in close proximity also contracted mesotheliomaraised in 1957 and arrangements were made for all employees involved with asbestos to be X-rayed and medically examined. In fact VIC RAIL was alerted to the problems of asbestos as early as 1953 (Peacock, 1978, p. 127 The different problem, of a relationship of mesotheHoma to crocidolite, was not then accepted. and
In the light of later information I would regard the exposure to blue asbestos u probably carrying a significant risk of mesothelioma.
6
Thus whilst VIC RAIL may not have realised in 1957-58 the precise dangers of exposure to asbestos, a number of subsequent events should have alerted VIC RAIL to these problems and to develop appropriate policies. These events include: (a) improved knowledge of asbestos related diseases, especially mesothelioma; {b) the publicity surrounding the closing down of the WittenoOJn Blue Asbestos ntlne in Western Australia in 1966; (c) the official diagnosis that the death of two VIC RAIL employees was due to ubeato"•.
(Another employee has retired due to the effects of asbestosis and a fowth employee bas developed mesothelioma.) All these workers were employed on the assembly of the Harris trains and workers' compensation was awarded to two of thexn. In 1971 VIC RAIL commenced a programme of remodelling the Harris carriages for lllf' in the Melbourne Underground Loop. The operation, carried out in the Bendigo worksbopa, involved removing partitions and cutting doors in both ends of the carriages. The workers, unaware of the dangers, had negotiated a special "dirt allowance" and apart from the occasional use of a cartridge type respirator were working unprotected. Six yean passed until in June 1977 a dispute arose concerning this special aDowance; it appeared VIC RAIL wanted to cut the allowance. The local shop stewards contacted their union, the ARU, and an organiser was dispatched to the Bendigo workshops. The official reported back that tbe men were working in "a most unsatifactory situation" in what appealed to be Again a stalemate had developed. Negotiations between the parties continued, however few concessions were granted by either VIC RAIL or the unions. The UDioDI COD· cerned about the advice from the IHD sought advice from the Workers' Health Reaourco Centre. This group, which has a decidedly different outlook from the DID agreed with the position adopted by the unions that no safe level of exposure existed.
VIC RAIL on the other hand, wishing for a quick resolution to the problema notified the ACAC of the existence of a dispute. On 17 March, 1978 a meeting between VIC RAIL and the unions agreed to a test run of protective equipment for a period of one week. This trial however was to be conducted on the "red and silver trains'~. Before this teat period was over the dispute came before the ACAC. A number of meetings between VIC RAIL and the unions followed, resulting in a compulsory conference of aD parties before the ACAC on 31 March, 1978 at the Jolimont workshops. The unions concem that Commissioner Walker, along with officials of VIC RAIL, were putting coDSiderable preaure on union officials to lift the bans.
During this conference the unions presented a 1 S-point proposal put forward by the Jolimont Shop Committee.
i. A special change room be set aside for the gear to be worn and that no baas be Hftecl until this is provided.
ii. The special gear be worn by all working on blue trains. iii. Supervisors who inspect or check work on blue trains also be required to wear spfdaJ gear while in, on, or under, blue trains. iv. That more powerful compresson or air lines be provided than were on Pdday, 3 March.
v. That no man be disadvantaged in conditions or employntent if he finds it to work wearing the gear. vi. That nobody be transferred out of the inspection shop who cannot work in unless he voluntarily agrees.
vii. Taking into account those who are unable to work in special par a rolter be wq.
amongst all others so that everyone has an equal share of working on blue tndnL viii. That each employee be issued with his own personal protective gear and no inter-changeability of such gear. ix. That the length of time that the average person can weu such gear and ceat1m1e work comfortably be assessed and no one work longer without a breath•. Regullltions. 1978) . Without aotaa lato $e cesses and influences in the development of these regulations, 11 it is lnteJeltlaa tO that the standard adopted was that proposed by the BOHS in 1969 and occurred some seven years after Queensland's initial asbestos rules. It has been the subject of much critice main because those actually at risk namely the workers, were not involved in
